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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3377
___________
GARMEI MARIE KENNEDY,
                                             Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                        Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A078-210-436)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 25, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 27, 2010)                                              
____________
 OPINION
____________
PER CURIAM.
Garmei Marie Kennedy petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her removal proceeding.  We
will dismiss the petition.
      The Supreme Court held that the BIA’s reasoning was invalid because the BIA1
believed itself bound on the issue by Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981),
which addressed a different statutory scheme.  See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1165-66.  The
Court remanded for the BIA to reevaluate the issue without treating Fedorenko as
controlling, though it acknowledged that the BIA might nevertheless reach the same
conclusion.  See id. at 1166-67.
2
I.
Kennedy is a citizen of Liberia.  An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her
claims for asylum and other forms of relief and ordered her removal to Liberia.  The IJ
concluded that Kennedy voluntarily assisted in the persecution of others while in Liberia
and is thus ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the so-called
“persecutor bar.”  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(i). 
The IJ also rejected Kennedy’s claims on the merits.  The BIA summarily affirmed on
July 9, 2004.  Kennedy did not petition for review, timely or otherwise, so we lack
jurisdiction to review these underlying rulings.  See Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 519 F.3d 143,
146 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)).
The Supreme Court later decided Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159
(2009), in which it remanded for the BIA to reconsider its long-standing position that the
persecutor bar applies even if an alien’s participation in persecution was involuntary.  1
The IJ found that Kennedy’s participation in persecution was voluntary.  Although
Kennedy did not seek review of that finding, she filed a motion to reopen on the basis of
Negusie.  She acknowledged that her motion was untimely because she did not file it
3within ninety days of the BIA’s previous decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2.  She requested, however, that the BIA exercise its authority to reopen
sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), on the grounds that Negusie represents a
fundamental change in the law.  The BIA denied the motion on July 16, 2009, and
Kennedy petitions for review.
II.
We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decisions regarding
reopening sua sponte because the regulation providing for that discretionary authority
“offers no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion.”  Calle-Vujiles v.
Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  We have recognized an exception permitting
review “if an agency ‘announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of
adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed[.]’” 
Id. (citation omitted). Kennedy argues that we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
ruling in this case because it has announced by course of adjudication a policy of
reopening sua sponte when there has been a change in the law, which she argues Negusie
represents.
We disagree.  Kennedy relies primarily on three BIA decisions: In re X-G-
W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71 (BIA 1998), abrogated on other grounds by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 359 (BIA 2002); In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999); and In re
Beckford, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1216 (BIA 2000).  These decisions do not establish a general
4policy of reopening on the basis of a change in the law.
In In re X-G-W-, the BIA announced a policy of reopening Chinese
coercive family planning cases on the basis of legislation making eligible for asylum
certain aliens who had not been eligible before.  22 I. & N. Dec. at 72-72.  This ruling
expressly applied only to a limited category of cases (and the BIA has since discontinued
the policy, see In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 361-62).  In In re G-D-, the BIA declined
to reopen on the basis of an asserted change in law that represented only an “incremental”
development rather than the kind of “fundamental change” at issue in In re X-G-W-.  22 I.
& N. Dec. at 1135.  The BIA explained that its decisions in these two cases were merely
“examples of the circumstances in which we deem it appropriate or inappropriate to
exercise our sua sponte authority to reopen[.]”  Id. at 1134-35 (emphasis added).  And In
re Beckford did not involve a change in the law at all.  The BIA in that case merely noted
that untimely motions to reopen must, “at a minimum, . . . demonstrate a substantial
likelihood that the result . . . would be changed if reopening is granted.”  22 I. & N. Dec.
at 1219 (emphasis added).  It did not hold that it would reopen whenever there was a
likelihood of a different result, let alone one based on a change in the law. 
In sum, we cannot conclude that the BIA has announced a policy governing
the exercise of its discretion under the circumstances presented here.  Accordingly, we
lack jurisdiction over Kennedy’s petition for review and will dismiss it on that basis.  The
Government’s motion for summary action is denied as moot.
